

**MINISTRY OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS
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National Contingency plan for managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents

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The contingency plan for managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents is the result of collaboration and input from experts in the field of emergency operations planning and response to terrorist events. The updated guidance in this document incorporates the most current information about national programs related to consequence management and addresses operational challenges that may be faced by responders to the terrorist attacks.

Interviews were conducted with representatives from different institutions that may be involved in the response to terrorism incidents. The interviewees were extremely generous with their time, and their efforts and insights are very much appreciated. The following organizations provided information:

- Rwanda National Police
- Ministry of Health
- Rwanda Biomedical Center
- Rwanda Defense Forces
- Rwanda Standard Bureau
- Rwanda Red Cross
- Ministry of Natural Resources
- Rwanda Housing Authority

We also appreciate the assistance provided by the staff of the Ministry of Disaster Management and the non-government members of the National Platform for Disaster Management.

We hope that the information contained in this National contingency plan will help to mitigate the risks and improve our readiness to respond jointly and effectively.

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Director of Disaster Response and Recovery Unit
Secretary of the National Platform for Disaster Management

FOREWORD

Over the last decade, the world has experienced numerous challenges due to terror attacks including explosives, hostage taking, chemical and biological, cyber-attacks and other forms of marvelous acts of terrorists. It is now obvious that the potential scope of destruction is limited only by terrorists' imagination. Rwanda, by considering the regional position and some regional security and political backgrounds is at risk of experiencing terror attacks, which call for readiness at all levels.

This National contingency plan for managing the emergency consequences of terrorist incident outlines the structures and processes required to maintain a high level of preparedness and readiness for the institutions in charge of responding to such incident and for the public to improve the level of awareness to terrorist related incidents.

It is not a counterterrorism or a terrorism control plan which is under the RNP and RDF; it is a plan to manage the consequences of terrorist incident by showing all interveners how to work together and their specific responsibilities. This plan recognizes indeed that the prevention and mitigation efforts established do not totally eliminate the risk, and therefore the response measures are necessary if any attack was materialized.

I therefore call upon all responders, government and non-government, at national and local level, to be aware on this plan and be able to use it if need could be.

MUKANTABANA Séraphine

Minister of Disaster Management and refugee Affairs

DEFINITIONS

The following are the main technical terms used in this document for the ease of users.

1. **Aerosol** – Fine liquid or solid particles suspended in a gas, for example, fog or smoke.
2. **Biological Agents** – Living organisms or the materials derived from them that cause disease in or harm to humans, animals, or plants or cause deterioration of material. Biological agents may be used as liquid droplets, aerosols, or dry powders.
3. **Chemical Agent** – A chemical substance that is intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects.
4. **Consequence Management** – Measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. National and local governments exercise primary authority to respond to the consequences of terrorism.
5. **Crisis Management** – This is the law enforcement aspect of an incident that involves measures to identify, acquire, and plan the resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat of terrorism.
6. **Cyber Terrorism** – Malicious conduct in cyberspace to commit or threaten to commit acts dangerous to human life, or against a nation's critical infrastructures, such as energy, transportation, or government operations in order to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population, or any sequence thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.
7. **Decontamination** – The process of making people, objects, or areas safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing the hazardous material.
8. **Infrastructure Protection** – Proactive risk management actions intended to prevent a threat from attempting to or succeeding at destroying or incapacitating critical infrastructures. For instance, threat deterrence and vulnerability defense.
9. **Mitigation** – Those actions (including threat and vulnerability assessments) taken to reduce the exposure to and detrimental effects of a terrorism incident.
10. **Non-persistent Agent** – An agent that, upon release, loses its ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes. It has a high evaporation rate, is lighter than air, and will disperse rapidly. It is considered to be a short-term hazard; however, in small, unventilated areas, the agent will be more persistent.
11. **Persistent Agent** – An agent that, upon release, retains its casualty-producing effects for an extended period of time, usually anywhere from 30 minutes to several days. A persistent agent usually has a low evaporation rate and its vapor is heavier than air; therefore, its vapor cloud tends to hug the ground. It is considered to be a long-term hazard. Although inhalation hazards are still a concern, extreme caution should be taken to avoid skin contact as well.
12. **Preparedness** – Establishing the plans, training, exercises, and resources necessary to achieve readiness for all hazards, including terror incidents.
13. **Radiation** – High-energy particles or gamma rays that are emitted by an atom as the substance undergoes radioactive decay. Particles can be either charged alpha or beta

particles or neutral neutron or gamma rays.

14. **Recovery** – Recovery, in this document, includes all types of emergency actions dedicated to the continued protection of the public or promoting the resumption of normal activities in the affected area.
15. **Response** – Executing the plan and resources identified to perform those duties and services to preserve and protect life and property as well as provide services to the surviving population.
16. **Terrorism** – The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. Domestic terrorism involves groups or individuals who are based within the country borders
17. **Toxicity** – A measure of the harmful effects produced by a given amount of a toxin on a living organism.

ACRONYMS

DDMC	District Disaster Management Committees
EOP	Emergency Operation Plan
EWS	Early Warning System
FRT:	First responders' teams
MIDIMAR:	Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs
MINAGRI:	Ministry of Agriculture
MINALOC:	Ministry of Local Government
MINECOFIN:	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MINIRENA:	Ministry of Natural Resources
MoH:	Ministry of Health
NDMEC	National Disaster Management Executive Committee
NDMTC:	National Disaster Management Technical Committee
NDMP	National Disaster Management Policy
NDRMP	National Disaster Risk Management Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPDM:	National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction
OR	Operation Room
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
RAB:	Rwanda Agriculture Board
RBC:	Rwanda Biomedical Center
RSB:	Rwanda Standard Bureau
REMA:	Rwanda Environment Management Agency
RNP:	Rwanda National Police
RNRA:	Rwanda Natural Resources Authority
RRC:	Rwanda Red Cross
RSB:	Rwanda Standard Bureau
SDMC	Sector Disaster Management Committee
WMD:	Weapon of mass destruction

1. PURPOSE

This guide is designed to help the emergency managers in developing and maintaining a Terrorist Incident management checklist to an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) for managing the consequences of terrorist incidents that involve weapons of mass destruction and other terrorism hazards. As demonstrated by the 2013-2014 terrorist attacks with grenades in Kigali and other cities and at regional level different terror attacks with bombs, weapons, hostages taking and so on, it is now evident that the potential scope of destruction is limited only by terrorists' imagination.

Given the creativity of those committed to carrying out acts of terrorism, planners are being challenged to “think outside the box “to plan for responding to the unimaginable. This guide responds by asking planners to consider a broad range of terrorist incidents, including assaults on infrastructure and electronic information systems that could result in consequences affecting human life, health, and safety.

The government has primary responsibility in planning for and managing the consequences of a terrorist incident using available resources in the critical hours. In its capacity as the lead agency responsible for coordinating the national aspects of consequence management, the Ministry of disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR) has prepared this guide as a means of outreach to all entities that may request National assistance in responding to the consequences of terrorist incidents.

2. TERRORISM HAZARDS

To be useful for the emergency responders, the Contingency plan for managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents should identify and discuss the nature of the terrorist hazard(s) that the country may face. The hazard may be WMD (including conventional explosives, secondary devices, and combined hazards) or other means of attack (including mass hostages taking, low-tech devices and delivery, attacks on infrastructure, attack on main public spaces [markets, schools, hospitals, hotels], and cyber terrorism).

Weapons of mass destruction are defined as any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals; disease organisms; radiation or radioactivity; or explosion or fire. At least two important considerations distinguish these hazards from other types of terrorist tools. First, in the case of chemical, biological, and radioactive agents, their presence may not be immediately obvious, making it difficult to determine when and where they have been released, who has been exposed, and what danger is present for first responders and medical technicians. Second, although there is a sizable body of research on battlefield exposures to WMD agents, there is limited scientific understanding of how these agents affect civilian populations.

2.1. Conventional Explosives and Secondary Devices.

The easiest to obtain and use of all weapons is still a conventional explosive device, or improvised bomb, which may be used to cause massive local destruction or to disperse chemical, biological, or radiological agents. The components are readily available, as are detailed instructions on constructing such a device. Improvised explosive devices are categorized as being explosive or incendiary, employing high or low filler explosive materials to explode and/or cause fires. Explosions and fires also can be caused by projectiles and missiles, and are the terrorist weapon most likely to be encountered. Large, powerful devices can be outfitted with timed or remotely triggered detonators and can be designed to be activated by light, pressure, movement, or radio transmission. The potential exists for single or multiple bombing incidents in single or multiple cities. Historically, many grenades attacks occurred in Kigali and other many city, and more seriously attacks have been recorded in the region within all neighboring countries. This is why the risk has to be considered and measures taken.

2.2. Chemical

Chemical agents are intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate people through physiological effects. A terrorist incident involving a chemical agent will demand immediate reaction from emergency responders—fire departments, police, hazardous materials, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency room staff—who will need adequate training and equipment. Hazardous chemicals, including industrial chemicals and agents, can be introduced via aerosol devices (e.g., munitions, sprayers, or aerosol generators), breaking containers, or covert dissemination. Such an attack might involve the release of a chemical warfare agent, such as a nerve or blister agent or an industrial chemical, which may have serious consequences.

There are both persistent and non-persistent chemical agents. Persistent agents remain in the affected area for hours, days, or weeks. Non-persistent agents have high evaporation rates, are lighter than air, and disperse rapidly, thereby losing their ability to cause casualties after 10 to 15 minutes, although they may be more persistent in small, unventilated areas.

Even if no chemical cases have been recorded in Rwanda and in the region but the risk is considerable because of some sabotage cases and accidents which causes were not known in the region.

2.3. Biological.

A biological hazard can occur through several methods, including identification of a credible threat, discovery of bioterrorism evidence (devices, agent, clandestine lab), diagnosis (identification of a disease caused by an agent identified as a possible bioterrorism agent), and detection (gathering and interpretation of public health surveillance data).

When people are exposed to a biological pathogen, they may not know that they have been exposed, and those who are infected, or subsequently become infected, may not feel sick for some time. This delay between exposure and onset of illness, the incubation period, is characteristic of infectious diseases. The incubation period may range from several hours to a few weeks, depending on the exposure and pathogen. Unlike acute incidents involving explosives or some hazardous chemicals, the initial detection and response to a biological attack on civilians is likely to be made by direct patient care providers and the public health community.

Terrorists could also employ a biological agent that would affect agricultural commodities over a large area (e.g., wheat rust or a virus affecting livestock), potentially devastating the local or even national economy. The response to agricultural bioterrorism should also be considered during the planning process.

Responders should be familiar with the characteristics of the biological agents of greatest concern for use in a bioterrorism event. Unlike victims of exposure to chemical or radiological agents, victims of biological agent attack may serve as carriers of the disease with the capability of infecting others (e.g., smallpox, plague).

2.4. Combined Hazards.

WMD agents can be combined to achieve a synergistic effect greater in total effect than the sum of their individual effects. They may be combined to achieve both immediate and delayed consequences. Mixed infections or toxic exposures may occur, thereby complicating or delaying diagnosis. Casualties of multiple agents may exist; casualties may also suffer from multiple effects, such as trauma and burns from an explosion, which exacerbate the likelihood of agent contamination. Attacks may be planned and executed so as to take advantage of the reduced effectiveness of protective measures produced by employment of an initial WMD agent. Finally, the potential exists for multiple incidents in single or multiple municipalities.

2.5. Other Terrorism Hazards

Emergency planners and managers also need to consider the possibility of unusual or unique types of terrorist attacks previously not considered likely. Although it is not realistically possible to plan for and prevent every conceivable type of terrorist attack, planners should anticipate that future terrorism attempts could range from simple, isolated attacks to complex, sophisticated, highly coordinated acts of destruction using multiple agents aimed at one or multiple targets. Therefore, the plans developed for terrorist incidents must be broad in scope yet flexible enough to deal with the unexpected. These considerations are particularly important in planning to handle the consequences of attacks using low-tech devices and delivery, assaults on public infrastructure, and cyber terrorism. In these cases, the training and experience of the responders may be more important than detailed procedures.

2.5.1. Low-Tech Devices and Delivery.

Planning for the possibility of terrorist attacks must consider the fact that explosives can be delivered by a variety of methods. Small explosive devices can be left in packages or bags in public areas for later detonation, or they can be attached directly to a suicide bomber for detonation at a time and place when and where the terrorist feels that maximum damage can be done. The relatively small size of these explosive devices and the absence of specific security measures in most areas make these types of terrorist attacks extremely difficult to prevent. Small explosive devices can also be brought onto planes, trains, ships, or buses, within checked bags or hand carried. Although present airline security measures minimize the possibility of explosives being brought on board airliners, planners will need to consider the level of security presently employed on buses within their jurisdictions. Larger quantities of explosive materials can be delivered to their intended target area by means of car or truck bombs. Responders need to consider the possible need to restrict or prohibit vehicular traffic within certain distances of key facilities identified as potential terrorist targets. Responders may also need to consider the possible use of concrete barriers to prevent the forced entry of vehicles into restricted areas.

2.5.2. Infrastructure Attacks

Potential attacks on elements of the nation's infrastructure require protective considerations. Infrastructure protection involves proactive risk management actions taken to prevent destruction of or incapacitating damage to networks and systems that serve society. There is an imminent need to evaluate the vulnerability to disruption of the nation's infrastructures, including electric power, oil and natural gas, main water sources and channels telecommunications, transportation, banking and finance, and vital government services.

Infrastructure protection often is more focused on security, deterrence, and law enforcement than on emergency consequence management preparedness and response. Nevertheless, planners must develop contingencies and plans in the event critical infrastructures are brought down as the result of a terrorist incident.

2.5.3. Cyber Terrorism

Cyber terrorism involves the malicious use of electronic information technology to commit or threaten to commit acts dangerous to human life, or against a nation's critical infrastructures in order to intimidate or coerce a government or civilian population to further political or social objectives. As with other critical infrastructure guidance, most cyber protection guidance focuses on security measures to protect computer systems against intrusions, denial of service attacks, and other forms of attack rather than addressing issues related to contingency and consequence management planning.

3. SITUATION AND RESPONSE ASSUMPTIONS

3.1. Situation analysis and scenarios

3.1.1. Scenario and planning assumptions

During the period from 2010-2014 many terrorist attacks using mainly explosives have been recorded in Rwanda. The attacks targeted especially markets and car parks to harm a big number of victims and as the other sensitive public areas were highly protected. Even if some measures have been taken, in the current global situation, any country can't state that the risk of terrorism is totally prevented or mitigated.

In addition to this, the position of the country in the region increases its vulnerability as some threats may come from neighboring countries where active terrorist groups are still operating.

Moving from the situation, we can think that the most probable scenario could be cases of bomb attacks and hostages taking in unprotected public spaces that could cause deaths, injuries and disturbance in public order and population serenity.

3.1.2. Potential Targets

In determining the risk areas, the vulnerabilities of potential targets should be identified by local government in details. This contingency plan provides just the points and ideas to be developed at a national level.

Various criteria may be used in determining the vulnerability of facilities to terrorist attack. These include factors such as population, accessibility, criticality to everyday life, economic impact, and symbolic value. In evaluating the vulnerability of facilities, national and local planners need to consider the existing security measures in place and the need, if any, to upgrade security.

Following are the probable target and mitigation and preparedness measures should be set:

- Schools
- Hospitals
- Main commercial complex

- Offices
- Market
- Car/Taxi park
- Water systems
- Power installations

3.1.3. **Initial Warning**

While specific events may vary, the emergency response and the protocol followed should remain consistent. When an overt terror incident has occurred, the initial call for help will likely come through the 112 (police emergency), 111 (police fire brigade) 912 (Emergency medical service) and 170 (disaster response coordination). This caller may or may not identify the incident as a terrorist incident, but may state only that there was an explosion, a major “accident,” or a mass casualty event. Information relayed through the dispatcher prior to arrival of first responders on scene, as well as the initial assessment, will provide first responders with the basic data to begin responding to the incident. With increased awareness and training about terrorist incidents, first responders should recognize that a terrorist incident has occurred. The information provided in this document applies where it becomes obvious or strongly suspected that an incident has been intentionally perpetrated to harm people, compromise the public’s safety and well-being, disrupt essential government services, or damage the area’s economy or environment.

Responders need to be aware of the likely occurrence of false warnings. Since these cannot be ignored, they must be investigated, resulting in wasted resources and psychological stress. Responders should develop procedures and training to deal with such threats.

3.1.4. **Initial Detection**

The initial detection of a terrorist attack will likely occur at the local level by either first responders or private entities (police district or sector office hospitals,). Consequently, first responders, the business community, and members of the medical community (both public and private) should be trained to identify hazardous agents and to take appropriate actions. National and local health departments, as well as local emergency first responders, will be relied upon to identify unusual symptoms, patterns of symptom occurrence, and any additional cases of symptoms as the effects spread throughout the community and beyond.

3.1.5. **Investigation and Containment of Hazards**

Local first responders will provide initial assessment or scene surveillance of a hazard caused by an act of terrorism. The institution authority mandated of dealing with and containing the hazard should be alerted to a suspected attack as soon as first responders recognize the occurrence of symptoms that are highly unusual or of an unknown cause. Consequently, National and local emergency responders must be able to assess the situation and request assistance as quickly as possible. A list of national institutions with specific response roles is in appendix 1.

3.2.RESPONSE ASSUMPTIONS

- 1 The first responder (police, reserve forces, volunteers, local committees, or law enforcement personnel) or health and medical personnel will in most cases initially detect and evaluate the potential or actual incident, assess casualties (if any), and determine whether assistance is required. If so, national support will be requested through MIDIMAR and provided. This assessment will be based on warning or notification of a terror incident.

- 2 The incident may require multi agency response. To ensure that there is one overall lead Agency, the NDMEC will decide to delegate another institution in addition to MIDIMAR and basing on the type of the incident occurring. In addition, MIDIMAR is designated as the lead agency for consequence management. MIDIMAR retains authority and responsibility to act as the lead agency for consequence management throughout the national disaster and emergency response system.

- 3 National response will include experts in the identification, containment, and recovery of the attack effects. The experts will come from the NDMTC and the NPDM.

- 4 The consequence management response will entail the involvement of MIDIMAR, additional FRTs, the NPDM members, the institutions members of the NDMTC, the Rwanda Red Cross and any other organization that may be required to intervene.

- 5 Response activities may continue for an extended period of days or weeks. Early emergency responders may be pushed beyond their capabilities, and national resources may be needed. The incident will be extensively covered by the media. There may be many volunteer responders and donations of food and material that will require management. This technical coordination will fall under the authority of MIDIMAR in partnership with the RNP.

4. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

This contingency plan includes a concept of operations section to explain the jurisdiction's overall concept for responding to a terrorism incident effects. Topics include division of responsibilities and the activation of the EOP mainly; It goes through the direction and control of operations, the communication,

4.1.Direction and Control.

The DDMCs supported by MIDIMAR and the RNP will respond to the incident scene(s) and make appropriate and rapid notifications to National level. Control of the incident scene(s) most likely will be established by local first responders mainly the RNP district offices. To assure continuity of operations, it is important that the Incident Command Post be established at a safe location and at a distance appropriate for response to a suspected or known terrorist incident. In addition, in severe terrorist attacks, response operations may last for very long periods, and there may be more leadership casualties due to secondary or tertiary attacks or events. MIDIMAR through the NDMEC should therefore provide for staffing key leadership positions in depth.

The Incident Command System (ICS) should be used by all responders such as police, army, medical emergency services, and all relevant responder personnel which should be trained in ICS use to prevent security and coordination problems in a multi-organization response.

Response to any terrorist incident requires direction and control. The planner must consider the unique characteristics of the event, identify the likely stage at which coordinated resources will be required, and tailor the direction and control process to merge these resources into an ongoing public health response. With many organizations involved, there is the danger of key decisions being slowed by too many layers of decision making. Planners should be aware of the need to streamline the decision-making process so that key decisions or authorizations regarding public health and safety can be obtained quickly.

4.2.Communications

In the event of a terrorism incident, rapid and secure communication is important to ensure a prompt and coordinated response. Strengthening communications among first responders, clinicians, emergency rooms, hospitals, mass care providers, and emergency management personnel must be given top priority in planning. The toll free of responsible institutions (RNP, SAMU, MoH and MIDIMAR) should be well operational,

In addition, terrorist attacks have been shown to overload non dedicated telephone lines and cellular telephones. In these instances, the Internet has proven more reliable for making necessary communications connections, although it should be recognized that computers may be vulnerable to cyber-attacks in the form of viruses. It is recommended that response organizations both establish relevant Internet connections with all coordinating emergency response organizations and have the use of these connections formalized in plans and practiced during training, drills, and exercises.

Responders with different functions may use different radio frequencies; hindering communications.

MIDIMAR and RNP should consider the distribution of priority emergency access telephone and other required communication tools to their emergency workers and key stakeholders. The responders should determine the existing status of their emergency communications systems and identify the funding needed to upgrade them.

4.3.Warning

Every incident is different. There may or may not be warning of a potential terrorism incident. Factors involved range from intelligence gathered from various law enforcement or intelligence agency sources to an actual notification from the terrorist organization or individual. The EOP should have facilities and transportation routes already mapped, along with emergency procedures necessary to respond.

- The warning or notification of a potential terrorist incident could come from many sources; therefore, open but secure communication among local and national law enforcement agencies and emergency response officials is essential. The local police stations must be notified of any suspected terrorist threats or incidents. Similarly, the police inform National and local law enforcement officials regarding potential threats. An integrated backbone communications system would be an aid in maintaining these communications channels and would expedite the dissemination of warnings about suspected terrorist threats. The interoperability of such a system would eliminate the need to switch back and forth between different communications systems for different organizations.
- **Pre-Event Readiness.** The emergency responders operates with a four-tier threat level system that can be used as a basis for initiating precautionary actions when a terrorist event is anticipated:
 - **Level Four (Minimal Threat).** Received threats do not warrant actions beyond normal liaison notifications or placing assets or resources on a heightened alert.
 - **Level Three (Potential Threat).** Intelligence or an articulated threat indicates the potential for a terrorist incident; however, this threat has not yet been assessed as credible.
 - **Level Two (Credible Threat).** A threat assessment indicates that a potential threat is credible and confirms the involvement of WMD in a developing terrorist incident. The threat increases in significance when the presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event or prior or actual injury or loss is confirmed or when intelligence and circumstances indicate a high probability that a device exists.
 - **Level One (Incident).** A WMD terrorism incident resulting in mass casualties has

occurred that requires immediate the national response system to provide support through intervention. The national response is primarily directed toward the safety and welfare of the public and the preservation of human life.

4.4. Emergency Public Information.

Terrorism is designed to be catastrophic. The intent of a terrorist attack is to cause maximum destruction of lives and property; create chaos, confusion, and public panic; and stress local, and national response resources. Accurate and timely information, disseminated to the public and media immediately and often over the course of the response, is vital to minimize accomplishment of these terrorist objectives.

Crisis research and case studies show that accurate, consistent, and expedited information calms anxieties and reduces problematic public responses such as panic and spontaneous evacuations that terrorists hope will hamper response efforts.

The news media will be the public's primary source of information, from both official and other sources, over the course of the emergency. Ensuring that the media will receive accurate, consistent, and expedited official information from the outset and over what may be a rapidly changing and lengthy response requires careful planning and considerable advance preparation. It is important to build and maintain a strong working relationship with the media. This relationship should include a clear commitment that government representatives will be immediately available to provide information over the course of the emergency.

Operation plans should reflect responsibility for emergency information operations during the crucial initial response until response personnel and resources can arrive to provide support. Responders also should reflect:

- A mechanism for sharing and coordinating information among all responding agencies and organizations,
- Development and production of information materials,
- Dissemination of information through various methods, and
- Monitoring and analysis of news media coverage with rapid response capability to address identified problems.

A strong and ongoing public education program for terrorism response, built upon outreach and awareness programs for other types of emergencies, can enhance the response organization's credibility and benefit both members of the public and first responder efforts in the event of a terrorist attack.

4.5. Protective Actions

Evacuation may be required from inside the perimeter of the scene to guard against further casualties from contamination by primary release of a terrorism agent, the possible release of additional threat, secondary devices, or additional attacks targeting emergency responders. Temporary in-place

sheltering may be appropriate if there is a short-duration release of hazardous materials or if it is determined to be safer for individuals to remain in place. Protection from biological threats may involve coercive or non-coercive protective actions, including isolation of individuals who pose an infection hazard, quarantine of affected locations, vaccination, use of masks by the public, closing of public transportation, limiting public gatherings, and limiting intercity travel. As with any emergency, government officials are primarily responsible for making protective action decisions affecting the public. Protocols should be established to ensure that important decisions are made by persons with the proper decision-making authority. The EOP should include provision for coordinating protective actions with other affected areas. Responders should also address ways of countering irrational public behavior that can hinder protective actions.

However, planning for evacuation should be flexible to account for difficult situations.

4.6. Mass Care

The location of mass care facilities will be based partly on the hazard agent involved. Decontamination, if it is necessary, may need to precede sheltering and other needs of the victims to prevent further damage from the hazard agent to either the victims themselves or the care providers. The Rwanda Red Cross (the primary agency for mass care), the MoH, the RNP and the reservists should be actively involved with the planning process to determine both in-place and mobile mass care systems for the emergency.

- Location, setup, and equipment for decontamination stations, if any.
- Mobile triage support and qualified personnel.
- Supplies and personnel to support in-place sheltering.
- Evacuation to an intermediary location to provide decontamination and medical attention.
- Determination of safety perimeters (based on agent).
- Patient tracking/record keeping for augmentation of epidemiological services and support.

4.7. Health and Medical

The basic EOP should already contain a Health and Medical **component**. Issues that may be different during a terrorist incident and that should be addressed in the TIA include decontamination, safety of victims and responders, in-place sheltering or quarantine versus evacuation, and multihazard /multiagent triage. Responders should anticipate the need to handle large numbers of people who may or may not be contaminated but who are fearful about their medical well-being. In addition, the EOC should identify the locations and capacities of medical care facilities. The EOC should also include a description of the capabilities of these medical care facilities, especially with regard to trauma care. Depending on the nature and extent of a terrorist attack, the most appropriate medical care facility may not necessarily be the closest facility.

The response to a bioterrorism incident will require the active collaboration of the clinicians and local public health authorities responsible for disease monitoring, treatment/immunization, and outbreak investigation. Their activities should be factored into the response planning.

Bioterrorism might involve infectious or communicable diseases. Therefore, the EOC should address powers, if any, given to public health authorities for quarantines and controlling medical facilities.

In addition, first responders may be entering an environment widespread with biological or chemical agents, radioactive materials, or hazardous air pollutants from collapsed buildings, or collapse of buildings might be imminent. Other incidents may pose environmental or physical risks to responders from a structurally damaged and potentially deadly pipeline, tank car, tank truck, or bridge. The responders should also address the need for first responders to perform a risk assessment and to modify standard protocols (e.g., establish plans for inoculating first responders) if the risk assessment so indicates. The responders should also address how such assessments are made and what resources they may indicate are needed. The assessment may indicate monitoring and sampling resources are needed before Federal resources can arrive. Responders will also need appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), including respirators. The responders should also address the availability of regional monitoring and sampling capability and PPE.

A bioterrorism incident raises several other special issues. Such an incident may generate an influx of patients requiring specialized care. If an infectious agent is involved, it may be necessary to isolate the patients and use special precautions to avoid transmission of the disease to staff and other patients. Responders should also consider the need to obtain and integrate supplementary medical professionals and technicians who may be needed to respond to a terrorist incident. In addition to physiological health considerations, responders should take into account the need for mental health considerations in the consequence management planning. Support must be provided not only to those individuals directly affected by a terrorist attack but also to those surviving family members experiencing emotional stress.

Response issues to consider include the following:

- Immunization for biological agents.
- Notification to and receipt of information from doctors/clinics.
- Augmentation of medical facilities and personnel.
- Management of medical supplies and equipment.
- Patient tracking/record keeping for augmentation of epidemiological services and support.
- Analytical laboratory support, specifying special considerations (e.g., testing capabilities) as appropriate.
- Mental health support services, including clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, etc.

4.8.Resources Management

The following considerations are highly relevant to terror incidents and should be addressed, if appropriate, in one or more appendixes to a resource management annex:

Nuclear, biological, and chemical response resources that are available through different required agreements

- Resources that are available through government institutions
- Resources that are available to local government
- Unique expertise that may be available through academic, research, or private organizations.
- Trained and untrained volunteer resources and unsolicited donated goods that arrive at the incident site

4.9.Recovery

A terror incident is a criminal act, and its victims or their families may be eligible for assistance under the national disaster response and recovery strategy. In addition, injured victims of a terrorist attack, those put at risk of injury, and the families of these persons may have suffered psychological trauma as a result of the attack and may be in need of crisis counseling.

In the event of an incident involving chemical or biological agents or radioactive materials, large areas or multiple locations may become contaminated. Decontamination may be required before buildings can safely be reoccupied and farms can again safely grow crops. While decontamination is taking place or until damaged buildings are repaired or replaced, persons must be relocated from residences and offices, and office equipment must be relocated from office buildings. Relocation after a terrorist incident tends to be of longer duration and entail greater costs than relocation following a natural disaster. Responders should take these factors into account and make appropriate arrangements.

4.10. Search and Rescue

Search and Rescue services involves rapid deployment of task forces to provide specialized lifesaving assistance including locating, extricating, and providing on-site medical treatment to those trapped in collapsed structures.

This activity should be organized basing of the type of incident, the extent and the needed services. A decision to deploy uniformed personnel, trained or untrained volunteers should be taken accordingly. The emergency response agencies should observe the principle of reaching any are of the country within six hours and sustain the responders for at least 48 hours.

5. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

As with any hazard-specific emergency, the organization for management of local response will probably need to be tailored to address the special issues involved in managing the consequences of a terrorist incident. The consequences of a terrorist act have the potential to overwhelm local capacity and may require assistance from national level. The response to a terrorist act, as well as the types of support and assistance from the national level will be different than the response to and support for other natural and manmade disasters. Because of this, not only must the plans be upgraded to include response to terrorist acts, but training and exercising must be expanded to ensure that the unique aspects of response to terrorist incidents can be carried out in a coordinated, effective manner.

Training needs to be planned for all staff involved in the response. National and local responders should identify their training needs, establish budgets for the training, and determine what funding resources will be required to implement the training. Periodic integrated exercises must also be conducted to ensure that the emergency response to a terrorist incident at the local and national levels can be adequately coordinated. The following response roles and responsibilities should be articulated performed:

5.1. Joint responsibilities

5.1.1. Local Emergency Responders

Local police units, district army units, reservists, DDMC members, Red Cross members, health centers and district hospitals will be among the first to respond to terrorist incidents, especially those involving WMD.

Primary Duties. The duties of local responders should be to detect the terrorism acts, preventing it from occurring IF POSSIBLE, secure the area, seek and share the information on what is happening with the national authorities.

5.1.2. National Emergency Responders

Upon determination of a credible terrorist threat, or if such an incident actually occurs, the national level may respond through the appropriate departments and agencies. These departments and agencies may include The RNP, the RDF, the RBC, the RAB, The RBS, and possibly the Rwanda Red Cross. For the management of terrorism effect the MIDIMAR may have a coordination role. The roles and responsibilities for national institutions and agencies participating in both crisis management and consequence management are detailed below.

Primary Duties. Upon determining that a terrorist incident is credible, the RNP Special Agent in Charge of counterterrorism will initiate liaison with other national agencies to activate their operations centers. The responsible in charge in MIDIMAR may activate this national contingency plan through the operation room contacts.

Once the RNP has determined the need to activate a Joint Operations Center (JOC) with

especially the RDF to support the incident site, MIDIMAR should also coordinates the agencies responsible for the Consequence Management based on need.

5.2.INSTITUTIONA RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR)

The Ministry of disaster management and refugee affairs (MIDIMAR) is the lead agency for consequence management and acts in support of the Rwanda National Police who is in charge of counterterrorism. Though National and local officials bear primary responsibility for consequence management, MIDIMAR coordinates the national aspects of consequence management in the event of a terrorist act. Consequence management includes protecting the public health and safety and providing emergency relief to National and local governments, businesses, and individuals.

- **Operation Room office:** This office is in charge of collecting analyzing and disseminating the information to relevant agencies and keeps under control the evolution of situation by providing clear guidance and accurate information. The OPO ensure the dissemination of the contingency plans that may be activated in case of terror attack and its aftershocks and facilitates its implementation.

The OPO develops and implements strategies for multi stakeholder's involvement in terrorism-related activities and coordinates overall relationships with other national institution and agencies involved in the consequence management response to terrorism-related activities.

The OPO should also identify all needed materials and tools to efficiently identify threats and guide the responders and victims. The office should liaise with responsible agencies and make the inventory of needed equipment and set a plan to fil the gaps.

- **Response and Recovery (RRR).** The Readiness, Response and Recovery **unit** is responsible for planning, training, conducting exercises, and leadership in the Federal consequence management response to terrorist events. The RR units develops and produces terrorism consequence management planning guidance for national and local governments, manages the terrorism consequence management planning assistance used by national and local governments for terrorism preparedness, and, in accordance with the RNP, manages national activities required to support the communities in the aftermath of a terrorist incident.

MIDIMAR Useful contacts:

- Web site: www.midimar.gov.rw,
- toll free: 170,
- SMS reporting system: 1700;
- Responsible staff: 0788554124

2. The Rwanda National Police (RNP)

The RNP is the lead agency for crisis management and investigation of all terrorism-related matters, including incidents involving a WMD. The main RNP's role is to coordinate the overall national response interventions. By assuming that a counterterrorism plan exists here we emphasize the role during the management of the aftermath's consequences of terrorism acts.

While responding to a terrorism incident (counterterrorism) the RNP should also secure the area to avoid major public troubles and facilitate the operations of other responders.

The Department of operations will be the one to collaborate closely with civil responders and will work with MIDIMAR to make sure that all interventions are being well coordinated to avoid duplication and misunderstanding of roles. The DO will also ensure that the other RNP departments involved are cooperating with the responders.

RNP Useful contacts:

- Web site: www.rnp.gov.rw
- Emergency:112
- Fire brigade:111
- Traffic:113
- Officer in charge:

3. The Rwanda Standard Bureau

The RBS holds some laboratories that may be useful to identify threats and advice for efficient interventions. Within the RBS Laboratory Division reside numerous assets, which can deploy to provide assistance in a terrorism/WMD incident. The Hazardous Materials personnel are highly trained and knowledgeable and are equipped to direct and assist in the collection of hazardous and/or toxic evidence in a contaminated environment.

The RSB will ensure the protection of the public by ensuring the acceptable and non-acceptable effects level on different sectors/fields and on the attitude to be taken. This will be done in tightly collaboration with relevant agencies and institution. The areas to be monitored after a terrorism effect include the agriculture and food security (in partnership with MINAGRI/RAB), the water safety (in partnership with WASAC), the chemical, biological and nuclear effects, the air and ecosystem pollution (in partnership with REMA).

4. The Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF)

In the event of a terrorist attack or act of nature on Rwanda soil resulting in the release of explosives, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear material or high-yield explosive devices, the responders: fire, and emergency medical personnel who are first to respond may become quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the attack. The Rwanda Defense Force has many unique warfighting support capabilities, both technical and operational, that could be used in support of National and local authorities, if requested by MIDIMAR and or RNP to support and manage the consequences of such a domestic event.

When requested, the RDF will provide its unique and extensive resources in accordance with the following principles.

- The RDF will ensure a clear chain of responsibility, authority, and accountability for its actions to ensure the Rwandan people that the military will follow the basic constructs of lawful action when an emergency occurs.
- In the event of a catastrophic terror event, RDF will always play a supporting role to the responders in accordance with all applicable plans and guidelines.
- The RDF support will emphasize its natural role, skills, and structures to mass mobilize and provide logistical support.
- The RDF will purchase equipment and provide support in areas that are largely related to its warfighting mission.
- Reserve forces members are RDF's forward-deployed forces for domestic consequence management and may even be deployed as a stand-alone support to response efforts.

5. The Ministry of Health and The Rwanda Biomedical center

The Ministry of Health, as the co-lead agency for health related Emergencies provides coordinated assistance to supplement national and local resources in response to public health and medical care needs following a major disaster or emergency. Additionally, MoH provides support during developing or potential medical situations and has the responsibility for national support of drug, and sanitation issues. MoH operational support to MIDIMAR may include mass immunization, mass prophylaxis, mass fatality management, pharmaceutical support operations (National Pharmaceutical Stockpile), contingency medical records, patient tracking, and patient evacuation and definitive medical care. Resources are furnished when Referral and district hospitals resources are overwhelmed and public health and/or medical assistance is requested from the National level.

MoH/RBC in its primary institutional role coordinates the provision of national health and medical assistance to fulfill the requirements identified by the authority of affected areas (districts). The specific roles include triage, treatment, and transportation of victims of the disaster; and evacuation of patients out of the disaster area,

Under the law, the MoH through the NDMEC has authority to regulate or prevent travel and shipments of goods between in order to control the spread of communicable disease, including the authority to apprehend, detain, or conditionally release individuals with particular diseases.

6. TERRORISM INCIDENT INDICATIONS AND FIRST RESPONDER CONCERNS

6.1.BIOLOGICAL

6.1.1. Indications

Indicators that a WMD incident involving biological agents has taken place may take days or weeks to manifest themselves, depending on the biological toxin or pathogen involved. The following list of epidemiologic clues may signal a bioterrorist event:

- Large number of ill persons with a similar disease or syndrome.
- Large numbers of unexplained disease, syndrome, or deaths.
- Unusual illness in a population or workplace.
- Higher morbidity and mortality than expected with a common disease or syndrome.
- Failure of a common disease to respond to usual therapy.
- Single case of disease caused by an uncommon agent.
- Multiple unusual or unexplained disease entities coexisting in the same patient without other explanation.
- Disease with an unusual geographic or seasonal distribution.
- Multiple atypical presentations of disease agents.
- Similar genetic type among agents isolated from temporally or spatially distinct sources.
- Unusual, atypical, genetically engineered, or antiquated strain of agent.
- Endemic disease with unexplained increase in incidence.
- Simultaneous clusters of similar illness in noncontiguous areas, domestic or foreign.
- Ill people presenting near the same time.
- Deaths or illness among animals that precedes or accompanies illness or death in humans.
- No illness in people not exposed to common ventilation systems, but illness among those people in proximity to the systems.

6.1.2. First Responder Concerns

- The most practical method of initiating widespread infection using biological agents is through aerosolization, where fine particles are sprayed over or upwind of a target where the particles may be inhaled. An aerosol may be effective for some time after delivery, since it will be deposited on clothing, equipment, and soil. When the clothing is used later, or dust is stirred up, responding personnel may be subject to “secondary” contamination.
- Biological agents may be able to use portals of entry into the body other than the respiratory tract. Individuals may be infected by ingestion of contaminated food and water, or even by direct contact with the skin or mucous membranes through abraded or broken skin. Use protective clothing or commercially available Level C clothing. Protect the respiratory tract through the use of a mask with biological high-efficiency particulate air filters.

- Exposure to biological agents, as noted above, may not be immediately apparent. Casualties may occur minutes, hours, days, or weeks after an exposure has occurred. The time required before signs and symptoms are observed is dependent on the agent used. While symptoms will be evident, often the first confirmation will come from blood tests or by other diagnostic means used by medical personnel.

6.2.CHEMICAL

6.2.1. Indications

The following may indicate a potential chemical WMD has been released. There may be one or more of these indicators present.

- An unusually large or noticeable number of sick or dead wildlife.
- Lack of insect life. Shorelines, puddles, and any standing water should be checked for the presence of dead insects.
- Considerable number of persons experiencing water-like blisters, weal's (like bee-stings), and/or rashes.
- Numbers of individuals exhibiting serious health problems, ranging from nausea, excessive secretions (saliva, diarrhea, vomiting), disorientation, and difficulty breathing to convulsions and death.
- Discernable pattern to the casualties. This may be "aligned" with the wind direction or related to where the weapon was released (indoors/outdoors).
- Presence of unusual liquid droplets, e.g., surfaces exhibit oily droplets or film or water surfaces have an oily film (with no recent rain).
- Unscheduled spraying or unusual application of spray.
- Abandoned spray devices, such as chemical sprayers used by landscaping crews.
- Presence of unexplained or unusual odors (where that particular scent or smell is not normally noted).
- Presence of low-lying clouds or fog-like condition not compatible with the weather.
- Presence of unusual metal debris—unexplained bomb/munitions material, particularly if it contains a liquid.
- Explosions that disperse or dispense liquids, mists, vapors, or gas.
- Civilian panic in potential high-profile target areas (e.g., government buildings, mass transit systems, sports facilities, etc.).
- Mass casualties without obvious trauma.
-

6.2.2. First Responder Concerns.

The first concern must be to recognize a chemical event and protect the first responders. Unless first responders recognize the danger, they will very possibly become casualties in a chemical

environment. It may not be possible to determine from the symptoms experienced by affected personnel which chemical agent has been used. Chemical agents may be combined and therefore recognition of agents involved becomes more difficult.

6.3.NUCLEAR/RADIOLOGICAL

6.3.1. Indications

Radiation is an invisible hazard. There are no initial characteristics or properties of radiation itself that are noticeable. Unless the nuclear/radiological material is marked to identify it as such, it may be some time before the hazard has been identified as radiological.

6.3.2. First Responder Concerns

While there is no single piece of equipment that is capable of detecting all forms of radiation, there are several different detectors for each type of radiation. Availability of this equipment, in addition to protective clothing and respiratory equipment is of great concern to first responders.

7. EXPLOSIVE/INCENDIARY

7.1. Indications.

Explosions and fires are sensate. They are readily seen and heard

7.2. First Responder Concerns.

- Emergency response units tend to be thin at the leadership level. Commanders may be tempted to leave their command posts to participate directly in lifesaving activities that should be performed by their staffs. Commanders/leaders should show discipline, not put themselves at undue risk, and continue to lead the response until relieved.
- Explosions and incendiary devices can cause fires. Thus one concern of first responders is to extinguish fires and rescue persons endangered by fire without putting themselves at undue risk. Fires may initiate secondary explosions, which may put secondary responders at risk of harm from blast.
- The incendiary terrorist attack generally gives intense heat which can cause building collapse. First responders can be harmed by the collapsing structure or by the consequential spread of debris.
- Terrorist attacks employing explosives, especially those involving suicide bombers and car bombs may include secondary devices targeted against responders.
- A number of first responders to the terrorism attack became ill from inhalation of health endangering particulates and aerosols. First responders should be

concerned about being equipped with appropriate personnel protective equipment (PPE) including respirators.

8. POTENTIAL AREA OF VULNERABILITY

Areas at risk may be determined by several points: population, accessibility, criticality (to everyday life), economic impact, and symbolic value. The identification of such vulnerable areas should be coordinated with the NDMTC.

Traffic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Determine which roads/bridges carry large volume of traffic -Identify points of congestion that could impede response or place citizens in a vulnerable area -Note time of day and day of week this activity occurs.
Trucking and Transport Activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Note location of hazardous materials (HazMat) cargo loading/unloading facilities. -Note vulnerable areas such as weigh stations and rest areas this cargo may transit.
Airports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Note information on carriers, flight paths, airport layout, and types of aircraft that use the facility. -Annotate location of air traffic control (ATC) tower, runways, passenger terminal, and parking areas.
Office Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Note location of national and local government offices. and the offices of International organizations (UN, embassies, IO, INGOs, NNGOs)
Social Economic Infrastructures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Note location of main banks, markets and supermarket, recreation areas, universities and schools, Hospitals and health centers
Hazardous Materials Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Map location of these facilities (such as electricity generating stations, oil storage facilities).
Water Supply Facilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Note the locations of water supply intakes from lakes or rivers. -Note the locations of water supply pipelines and holding areas such as reservoirs and tanks. -Note the locations of water supply treatment plants.
Computer Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Identify governmental and business-related computer systems located within the jurisdiction and ascertain their Level of protection against terrorist cyber-attack.
<p>NOTE: Security and emergency personnel representing all of the above facilities should work closely with local and national personnel for planning and response.</p>	

9. EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION

9.1.PRIMARY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The accurate and timely dissemination of critical information to the public in the aftermath of a terrorist incident is an integral element of the emergency response. Emergency information operations must be initiated immediately following a terrorist attack and continued until external information needs are fully satisfied. Official information disseminated in the response phase will support and enhance alert and notification messages. As the operation shifts into the longer term, information will play an important role in facilitating recovery.

While providing the community with information is paramount, careful consideration must be given to developing and implementing a strategic media-relations plan. This is because it is through the news media (local, national, regional and international) that most communications will take place. Moreover, a terrorist event immediately becomes the focus of national and international news media. Within hours of a major terrorist event, hundreds of reporters with satellite trucks, camera equipment and staff will descend on the affected community.

Following a terrorism event, the news media can be counted on to provide official announcements as well as other information developed through independent reporting. The public looks to the news media – newspapers, radio, television and the Internet -- as its primary source of information. The specific informational focus of each media outlet depends largely on its audience, with local media providing the most detailed coverage and national and international media looking at broader story elements. Even with these different levels of focus, today's media environment, with its portable satellite technology and never-ending news cycle, creates a situation in which there is no such thing as strictly local news in a terrorism situation.

Research and case studies show that accurate, consistent, and expedited information in crisis situations calms anxieties and reduces problematic public responses, such as fear, panic, spontaneous evacuation, and antisocial behavior. Lack of information or a bombardment of conflicting information from numerous sources may endanger public health and safety and encourage some members of the public to act in ways that cause additional problems for responders. The regular dissemination of official information that is useful, consistent, and easy to understand contributes to the overall well-being of the community. Establishment and maintenance of a strong working relationship with the news media will have positive impacts across the emergency response.

Given the many demands that occur in the immediate aftermath of an emergency event, there is little time to develop a detailed, post-incident public information program. As with **each** operational aspect of the response, effective emergency information following a terrorist attack requires careful planning and considerable advance preparation.

Depending upon the nature and location of the terrorism incident, local officials, with rapid support, will have initial responsibility for ensuring that the news media and public are provided with accurate, timely, and pertinent information. This information may address topics such as

evacuation and sheltering-in-place, road closures, areas to avoid, bulletins to “stay off the phones” and “be on the lookout,” bulletins, and other information to protect life and property and assist first responders.

Planning and preparedness considerations are addressed in the following sections.

9.2.JOINT INFORMATION SYSTEM

- The mission of the Joint Information System (JIS) is to provide a mechanism for disseminating uniform, coordinated, and consistent information from government officials and first responders to the news media and the public.
- In establishing a JIS, the first step is development of a comprehensive information exchange list. The list should identify each agency, office, and organization that may be part of the emergency response network and note their respective responsibilities, including the type of information each would be responsible for or able to provide. The exchange list also should establish specific means for exchanging information among the participants.
- Volunteer agencies (such as the Rwanda Red Cross), utilities, hospitals, and political offices should be included in the list.
- The list should include established points of contact and multiple means of communication (e.g., phone, pager, cell, fax). In this planning stage, it should be determined whether the JIS member will assign a spokesperson or other staff to a media center, if established.
- Wherever possible, written procedures should be developed, such as memoranda of agreement or understanding, that detail how information will be exchanged and coordinated within the JIS and with external audiences. It is helpful for agency points of contact to meet frequently and work together, even in emergency situations that require limited JIS participation.
- In a terrorism situation, the Rwanda National Police and The Ministry of Disaster Management and refugee Affairs may establish one or more joint information center that will include national and local representatives, though this may take at least several hours.
- The MIDIMAR Operation room and the office of Public Relation and Communication should liaise with the Police spokesperson office to guide communication and information channeling.

8.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOOD PARTNERSHIP WITH NEWS MEDIA

- The primary objective of emergency information staff working with the media should be to establish lines of communication to official, credible sources of information and inform the media where they can get this information.
- It is important that media representatives know where to find accurate and timely information about the consequences of the terrorist event and the steps people can take to maximize their safety and move through the recovery process.
- It is equally important that the media recognize where they can quickly obtain official verification of information from other sources to minimize dissemination of misinformation, rumors, and speculation to the public. During a response, the news media will gather information, conduct interviews, and offer perspectives and analyses of the situation from many sources and locations in their pursuit of the emergency story.
- Media monitoring and analysis aids the overall response by:
 - Providing early warning of incorrect information, gaps in information, and potential problem areas.
 - Stopping the spread of rumors that can cause people to take actions that can be harmful to their recovery.
 - Providing information to decision-makers that can be useful in developing operational plans and strategies.
- Establishing a strong working relationship with the news media prior to an event makes it more likely that the public will get accurate, understandable, and meaningful emergency information when they need it. News media outlets must have confidence that government representatives will be immediately available to explain complex issues, share important public safety messages, and provide a continuing flow of information throughout the emergency.
- Coordination and information sharing assure consistency of official information, enhance credibility of government response efforts, and encourage public understanding and support.
- Media relations activities should use all appropriate tools (e.g., news releases, briefings, press conferences), to provide clear and focused information.
- Contacts with local and regional news media contacts should be established and maintained — through editorial boards and regular interactions with reporters, editors, news directors, and producers during nonresponse periods.
- In preparing for a terrorism incident, identified responders members should train and exercise extensively, including cross training in the specific functions. Exercises provide an opportunity to test-run the joint response structure.
- Planning should address situations where staffing, facilities, equipment, and other resources may be inadequate to meet the needs of the news media or public.
- In the event of surges in calls from the news media or public, emergency information

staff should be prepared to augment personnel and equipment quickly.

- In preparing for a major terrorism event, a strong element of flexibility in the public information program should be maintained so that unexpected issues can be quickly and effectively addressed.
- Communications may fail, facilities may be inaccessible, and staff may be unavailable or unable to reach the JIC. Planning should include contingencies for all such possibilities.
- Maintain an ongoing public education program to build public confidence in response organizations and encourage positive public reaction during a terrorism act
- Build public education programs on existing education programs for other types of emergencies, such as floods and hazardous materials accidents.
- Make the public aware of emergency plans and procedures (including protective actions) that will or may be employed to protect public health, safety, and property in a terrorism situation.
- Enlist the help of the media and community, business, and religious organizations to raise awareness about what individuals, families, and business owners and managers can do now to prepare for emergencies.
- Pay particular attention to public outreach efforts related to protecting school children, so that parents and guardians won't immediately crowd the roads and hamper responders in their rush to collect children at schools.
- Identify other target audiences such as non-Kinyarwanda-speaking populations; pet owners; residents and families of those in special facilities (e.g., nursing homes, jails); residents and staff of colleges and universities; employees and visitors of shopping malls, commercial complexes or businesses, and entertainment and sports facilities who may need tailored information.